

How Partisan Is Local Law Enforcement? Evidence from Sheriff Cooperation with Immigration Authorities*

Daniel M. Thompson[†]
Department of Political Science
Stanford University

July 26, 2018

Abstract

Is local law enforcement conducted differently based on the party in power? I offer an answer to this question by focusing on a case in which law enforcement is elected and has meaningful independent discretion: sheriff compliance with federal requests to detain unauthorized immigrants. Using a regression discontinuity design in a new dataset of over 3,200 partisan sheriff elections and administrative data on sheriff behavior, I find that Democrats and Republicans comply at nearly the same rate. These results contribute to ongoing research into the role that partisanship plays in local policymaking, indicating that law enforcement officers make similar choices across party lines even when they have broad authority. I also present evidence that sheriffs hold more similar immigration enforcement views across party than the general public, highlighting the role of candidate entry in determining the level of partisan polarization.

*For helpful discussion, the author thanks Andy Hall, Jens Hainmueller, Mirya Holman, Nathan Lee, Hans Lueders, Clayton Nall, and Jesse Yoder as well as members of the Stanford Immigration Policy Lab and the Stanford Working Group on Empirical Research in American Politics. Data on immigration enforcement was provided by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University. I received support for this project from the Stanford Immigration Policy Lab.

[†]Daniel M. Thompson is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6044 (danmckinleythompson@gmail.com, <http://www.danmthompson.com>).

1 Introduction

The direct election of executives with police power is a key feature of the American system. The rise in partisan polarization across the country has raised concerns that these local executive elections lead elected officials to apply the law differentially for partisan reasons, rather than to act as neutral arbiters, compromising the legitimacy of law enforcement.¹ Yet, these elections could also act as a moderating force, selecting candidates who advocate a politically neutral approach to law enforcement. Do elected law enforcement officials make partisan enforcement decisions?

Republican and Democratic representatives make unmistakably different policy choices across a wide range of offices, even when compared to others serving the same constituents (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Besley and Case 2003; Caughey, Xu, and Warshaw 2017; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2018; Fowler and Hall 2016; Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004). The similarity of policies put in place by Republican and Democratic executives at the local level may be an exception, or it may simply reflect the constraints executives face (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009; Gerber and Hopkins 2011). Recent evidence suggests that executives may move policy in their party’s preferred direction when they have the necessary discretion (de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2016; Kousser 2002).

In order to isolate the differences between Republicans and Democrats in terms of the policies they choose, I focus on a case in which the local policymaker has considerable flexibility: a sheriff’s decision to detain unauthorized immigrants on behalf of federal immigration authorities. The vast majority of states during the period I study place no constraints on a sheriff’s choice to comply with these requests from immigration authorities. Given the authority sheriffs have over compliance with these detainer requests and the scale of their use—more than 677,000 instances of detention—journalists and advocates have argued that sheriffs determine immigration enforcement levels in their counties.²

¹Gordon (2009) discusses this problem at the federal level. For recent accounts of ideological law enforcement in the popular press, see “The Renegade Sheriffs” in the *New Yorker* (<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/30/the-renegade-sheriffs>) and “County Sheriff Races in 2018 Might Be the Key to Resisting Trump’s Immigration Plans” on Vox (<https://www.vox.com/2018/5/10/17339274/midterms-primaries-immigration-elections>).

²See, for example, “County Sheriff Races in 2018 Might Be the Key to Resisting Trump’s Immigration Plans” (<https://www.vox.com/2018/5/10/17339274/midterms-primaries-immigration-elections>). “The Renegade Sheriffs” in the *New Yorker* also discusses some of these issues (<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/30/the-renegade-sheriffs>).

Approximately 85% of counties in the US select their sheriff using a partisan election. Simply comparing compliance in places that elect Democrats to those that elect Republicans could capture differences due to factors other than who controls the sheriff’s office. I overcome this using a regression discontinuity design, estimating the difference in compliance between counties that just barely elect a Democrat or Republican (Eggers et al. 2015).³ I use my newly collected dataset of 3,500 sheriff elections along with administrative data measuring sheriff compliance with detainer requests to estimate this difference. I find that, in counties with close elections, the average Democratic sheriff cooperates at nearly the same rate as the average Republican sheriff.

As I detail below, a sheriff’s choice to cooperate with immigration authorities is only one step in the path from arrest to deportation. I use the same regression discontinuity design to test for differences in the number of background checks they send to the Department of Homeland Security and the policies they state publicly. These measures are noisier, but I also find no substantial partisan differences between Democratic and Republican sheriffs on these other dimensions.

A small number of states introduced policies during the period I study that make it easier for immigration authorities to detain unauthorized immigrants, or policies that make it harder for sheriffs to cooperate. Though the estimates are less precise, I find that the difference in compliance between Republican and Democratic sheriffs is nearly the same regardless of whether these policies are in place.

Among the most common explanations for partisan divergence in other settings is the citizen-candidate model (Alesina 1988; Besley and Coate 1997; Osborne and Slivinski 1996). This class of models, which points to candidate entry costs as an important factor in determining representation, is connected to a large empirical literature on the causes and consequences of candidate entry (e.g., Besley 2004; Fox and Lawless 2005; Hall 2017; Thomsen 2014). One important potential explanation for partisan convergence arising from this line of research is that Democrats and Republicans who run for sheriff have similar policy preferences. This runs counter to expectations based on other offices and the public. As I show, Republicans vote for immigration enforcement efforts at much higher rates when compared to Democrats from similar districts. Similarly, Republicans in the public are more likely to support immigration enforcement policies compared to Democrats in the

³For a broader review of regression discontinuity designs in political science, see Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik (2017); de la Cuesta and Imai (2016); Skovron and Titiunik (2015).

same county. Republican sheriff candidates, too, are more likely to make campaign contributions to Republicans than Democrats in their private life.

Still, there are reasons to expect that Democratic and Republican sheriff candidates have similar views on immigration enforcement. Unlike the US House, for which people with a wide variety of backgrounds successfully run, more than 95% of sheriffs have prior law enforcement experience (Farris and Holman 2015, 2017). Fourteen states codify this by requiring all sheriff candidates to have prior law enforcement experience. In a new analysis of the survey presented in Farris and Holman (2017), I find that Democratic and Republican sheriffs respond in a more similar way to immigration questions than do Democrats and Republicans in the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). Democratic and Republican sheriffs also express more similar views on local immigration enforcement than federal immigration enforcement. This evidence is not conclusive, but it suggests that general election sheriff candidates are already more alike than their co-partisans on immigration enforcement matters.

Yet, this is not the only possible explanation for this pattern of survey results. Another class of models focused on elections and accountability find that reelection incentives encourage moderation even when candidates hold more ideological views (Ashworth 2012; Fearon 1999). If sheriffs are seeking reelection and voters punish deviations from their preferred policy, sheriffs who reach a term limit may be more willing to move policy in their preferred direction. This does not appear to be an important contributor to policymaking in state and federal legislatures (Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004; Fourinaies and Hall 2018). I present suggestive evidence that Democratic and Republican sheriffs also do not diverge when they reach a limit on the number of terms they can hold office.

These findings suggest that burdensome state and federal policy are not the only reason that local offices often exhibit less partisan divergence. And these results allay concerns that immigration law is enforced differently based on the partisan attachments of the executive in charge. A growing body of evidence in political science has pointed out the link between partisan polarization and the costs of running for office (e.g., Hall 2017; Thomsen 2014). My results offer one counter example: the barriers to entry are high, yet Democratic and Republican sheriffs make similar immigration enforcement choices once in office.

2 Sheriffs and Immigration Enforcement

2.1 Sheriff Elections

Unlike most other law enforcement officials, the vast majority of sheriffs are elected. Out of 3,142 counties or county equivalents,⁴ 3,083 in 46 states elect a county sheriff.⁵ Five states, and a small number of counties outside of these states, hold non-partisan sheriff elections.⁶ The remaining 41 states, totaling to more than 2,700 counties, hold partisan sheriff elections.

2.2 The Role of Sheriffs in Immigration Enforcement

Immigration policy is largely a federal matter, but the federal authorities request help from sheriffs at a few important junctions.⁷ Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for most interior enforcement of federal immigration law. The supremacy clause of the US Constitution has been read by numerous courts to imply that local and state law enforcement officials cannot be compelled to enforce immigration law.⁸ Nevertheless, local law enforcement agencies still come across immigrants who are unlawfully in the US in the course of their regular duties. Sheriffs, who are responsible for most jails, run federal background checks on most people who come into their custody. These background checks are administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and, in recent years, have been shared with the DHS. The DHS then checks the immigration status of the individual held by a sheriff. If the DHS flags the person being held as an unauthorized immigrant, ICE will often send a request to the sheriff asking that she detain the immigrant for an additional 48 hours beyond scheduled release so that ICE can pick up the person and process them through the immigration system. Figure 1 describes the basic path an unauthorized immigrant could take from arrest to deportation under the program that is currently active, Secure Communities.

⁴This is the unique number of county FIPS codes in US States (excluding DC and US territories) according to the US Census as of 2010.


⁵Alaska, Connecticut, and Hawaii do not have local sheriffs. Rhode Island's sheriffs are appointed by the Governor. A small number of counties outside of these states, such as the boroughs of New York City, do not elect a sheriff.

⁶These states are California, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oregon, and Tennessee.

⁷For a helpful discussion of the history of federal, state, and local immigration policy, see Provine et al. (2016).

⁸See *Galarza v Szalczyk* from the US Court of Appeals for the Third District. This was an active area of litigation throughout the period I am studying. In practice, the federal government avoided direct enlistment of local officials into immigration enforcement until 2013, and then it was quickly struck down.

Figure 1: **Status of Unauthorized Immigrant from Arrest to Deportation, Secure Communities Program.** The process of identifying and removing an unauthorized immigrant accused of committing a crime in the interior often requires cooperation between federal and local law and immigration enforcement. Decisions made independently by actors at the federal or local level can make it much harder for a particular unauthorized immigrant to be identified or removed.



ICE started operations in 2003 but detainer requests were relatively uncommon in the early years of the bureau. In 2008, ICE launched the Secure Communities program as a pilot. In this first phase, ICE gained permission from local law enforcement agencies to review the background checks they sent to the FBI. This window into who a participating sheriff had in their custody allowed ICE to check their own databases for an arrestee’s immigration status and more easily detain those accused and convicted of crimes. ICE expanded this data sharing program through the first years of the Obama administration until, in 2013, all law enforcement agencies were automatically made participants. In practice, most sheriff offices with large populations were participants by 2011.

More than 368,000 deportations since 2009 began with an apprehension under a well-defined interior enforcement program. Of those deportations, over 153,000 were facilitated by the Secure Communities program. Another 115,000 were initiated under the 287(g) program that also enlists local law enforcement in cooperation with ICE.⁹

3 Empirical Approach

3.1 Competitive Partisan Elections for Sheriff, 2003-2016

For this project, I gathered an original dataset of 3,500 sheriff elections held between 2003 and 2016. Fifteen states with partisan sheriff elections collect most or all county-level election results

⁹Like other immigration enforcement measures, these statistics come from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University.

at the state level for some of the years I am studying.¹⁰ I collected all of these election results. I supplemented this data by collecting sheriff election results from 2003 to 2016 for every county with a population over 100,000 according to the 2000 Census. I collected this data from each of the roughly 400 county election boards directly. I focused on large counties because they are more likely to have a large enough population of unauthorized immigrants that at least some would end up in a sheriff’s custody and be subject to a detainer request.

Table A.1 in the appendix compares the sample to all regularly-scheduled general elections for sheriffs that occurred from 2003-2016.¹¹ My sample covers 80% of all partisan sheriff elections held in high-population counties during this period and 32% of all sheriff elections. Since the large, partisan sample is nearly a census, the elections I collected look very similar to the full set of elections held in terms of geographic distribution, voting population, recent presidential voting, and partisan control of the governor’s office and state legislature. Overall, my sample includes fewer sheriff races in the Midwest and more everywhere else.¹² I also have more elections in larger counties and counties with larger foreign-born populations.

37% of all partisan races in my sample, and 48% of the large-county elections, have at least one Democrat and Republican competing. In both the full sample and the large-county sample, roughly 55% of races have two or more candidates receiving votes. The typical vote share for the winner is 78%, coding uncontested candidates as receiving 100% vote share. Table 1 reports these descriptives in full. For comparison, I include the same statistics for US House general elections held during this period, 83% of which had a Republican and Democrat running and only 6% of which were uncontested.

3.2 Detainer Requests and Compliance, 2006-2015

I also collected data on detainer requests from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University. Their team uses Freedom of Information Act requests to acquire data on every detainer request made by ICE and records on whether the subject of the request is

¹⁰These states are Arkansas, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Vermont, and West Virginia.

¹¹My data on sheriff election timing comes from the National Sheriff’s Association, with minor corrections based on records from county election administrators.

¹²Data on state partisan control comes from Carl Klarner’s State Partisan Balance Data and Governors Dataset. Presidential voting by county come from Dave Leip’s Atlas of Presidential Elections.

Table 1: **Sheriff Election Characteristics.** Sheriff elections have fewer candidates than US House elections and winners win with a greater share of the vote. Counties with large populations (more than 100,000 citizens as of 2000) have more races with a Democrat and a Republican.

	All Counties	Large Counties	US House
<i>Partisan Competition</i>			
At Least One Dem	0.60 (0.49)	0.65 (0.48)	0.91 (0.28)
At Least One Rep	0.66 (0.47)	0.80 (0.40)	0.91 (0.28)
Both Parties	0.37 (0.48)	0.48 (0.50)	0.83 (0.37)
<i>Candidate Entry</i>			
One Candidate	0.45 (0.50)	0.43 (0.50)	0.06 (0.23)
Two Candidates	0.46 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)
Three Candidates	0.07 (0.25)	0.06 (0.24)	0.32 (0.46)
<i>Competitiveness</i>			
Winning Vote Share	0.79 (0.20)	0.78 (0.21)	0.66 (0.13)
Num of Counties	1282	397	-
Obs	3226	1216	3023

Standard deviation in parentheses. Large counties are those with populations greater than 100,000 as of the 2000 Census. Candidates who receive less than 1% of the vote do not count toward the number of candidates.

ultimately detained. Their data also notes the institution that receives the request, the state and county where the institution is located, whether the institution is run by the county, city, state, or federal government, and the month in which the request was sent. I used their database to obtain the number of detainer requests received every month by each institution broken out by whether ICE ultimately detained the individual. I split out the institutions such as state and federal prisons not run by the county sheriff and aggregated the data to the county-by-year level.

This data highlights the importance of the Secure Communities program. The roll out of the program coincided with a ramp up from 110,000 requests and 80,000 detainees in 2008 to 201,000

requests and 115,000 detainees in 2011. As federal policy changed to limit detainer request for those not convicted of a crime, the number of detainer requests has dropped. Only 83,000 requests were made in 2014—39,000 resulted in ICE detaining the individual. Figure A.1 in the appendix presents these trends.

This data from TRAC can be further divided by whether the arrestee was convicted of a crime and, if so, how serious. The seriousness ranges from level 3, which is composed of misdemeanors, to level 1 which captures what ICE calls “aggravated felonies,” including murder, rape, and drug trafficking.

My primary measure of sheriff immigration policy is the rate at which sheriffs comply with detainer requests. I calculate a sheriff’s compliance rate as the share of detainer requests that result in detention. This means that when no detainer requests are made, I do not have a measure for the compliance rate for that county and time period.

I focus on this measure for a substantive and a methodological reason. First, sheriffs are able to manipulate this outcome directly. One of the challenges in previous work studying the behavior of executives is that they often have limited control over outcomes we can easily measure—fiscal policies are often set in part by legislatures, broad economic indicators are likely not immediately responsive to executive choices, etc. By contrast, even offices that receive many requests, resulting in a good measure of the underlying willingness to comply, display considerable heterogeneity in compliance rates. Roughly 20% of sheriffs receiving more than 80 requests comply less than 30% of the time or more than 80% of the time with a standard deviation of 18%. Figure A.2 in the appendix plots the distribution of compliance rates by decile of the number of requests received.

I also focus on compliance rates because they do not require any normalization. Most outcomes that a sheriff can affect, such as the number of detainer requests with which they comply or the number of background checks they submit, have an unobserved base rate. Though the causal identification strategy I explain below ensures that these base rates are equal for Democratic and Republican sheriffs in expectation, the unobserved base rates increase the variance of the estimated difference between Republican and Democratic sheriffs. The compliance rate solves this problem at a cost. The ideal way to normalize the measure of compliance would be to use the expected number of opportunities for ICE to send a detainer request. This is unobservable. Instead, I use the number of requests ICE makes. Since this number could be impacted by strategic choices ICE

makes in response to the behavior of the sheriff, it is also an outcome in some sense and could introduce a bias. I am able to check this, and I present these checks along with the results.

3.3 Other Ways Sheriffs Can Impact Immigration Policy

The compliance rate is a useful measure of the immigration enforcement policy a sheriff is pursuing because it captures the outcome of an important immigration policy decision sheriffs have the authority to make, it is sensitive to many policies a sheriff can implement, and it has an interpretable scale. But, sheriffs are also able to change policies in ways that impact local immigration enforcement but may not change the compliance rate. I obtained two additional datasets that measure some of these policy outcomes. The first is a dataset on the policies sheriffs say they had toward cooperation with ICE as of 2015, collected by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center. This data was collected over time with some updates after 2015 without a clear note regarding when the policy changed. I treat these policies as though they were active in 2015 for the analysis.

I also collected data from reports ICE made to Congress on the progress of the Secure Communities program. These reports include roughly annual updates on the number of background checks submitted from a particular county, how many identified an unauthorized immigrant, and how many identified people were ultimately deported. This data runs from 2012 to 2015.

3.4 Regression Discontinuity Design in Sheriff Elections

For my main results, I estimate regression functions of the form

$$Y_{ct} = \mu + \tau Dem_{ct} + f(V_{ct}) + X_{ct}\beta + \epsilon_{ct}$$

where Y_{ct} is an immigration enforcement-related outcome in county c and year t . Dem_{ct} is a dummy variable indicating a Democratic sheriff winning the election, and $f(V_{ct})$ is a flexible function of the running variable which is the percentage of the two-party vote share going to the Democrat minus 50 so that a 50/50 election is 0 on this scale. I subset the data to cases where the winner and runner-up are a Democrat and Republican, in any order. This means that τ is the effect of having a Democrat elected as the sheriff conditional on a 50/50 tie between a Republican and Democrat.

Finally, X_{ct} is a set of controls that I leave out of most specifications but include to increase the precision of my treatment effect estimate and as a robustness check.

The key identifying assumption behind this design is that the degree to which a Democrat and Republican would comply with a detainer request both change smoothly with the Democratic vote share near the 50/50, perfect tie threshold (Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010). This is a highly plausible assumption. As Eggers et al. (2015) point out, a violation of this assumption would require incredibly good information about voting patterns in the county or illegal vote editing, and this capacity would have to be differential across parties. Eggers et al. (2015) tests this assumption in a large number of American elections, and some outside of the US, and finds very little evidence for violations.¹³ I report a test of this assumption with my data in Table A.2 in the appendix. Though the tests are somewhat noisy, I do not find strong evidence for bias.

Still, even a perfectly randomized experiment can have imbalances due to sampling variability. This can happen in an observational setting too. As I mentioned above, I report some estimates with controls, including a flexible function of the lag of the outcome variable, to adjust for any remaining pre-treatment imbalances between the potential outcomes at the 50/50 threshold.

An important part of estimating the effect in a regression discontinuity design is to make sure that the functional form of f is appropriate. A bias-variance trade-off arises here in which one would like to use a flexible functional form, but if the true relationship between the potential outcomes and the running variable is a low-order polynomial, a more flexible functional form could produce an estimate in any given sample that is much further from the true effect. I address this by reporting the results using many functional forms and showing that estimate is robust to changes in the functional form and the subset of the data used to estimate the effect. Given that the estimated pre-treatment difference between Democrats and Republicans is closest to zero when I use the regression with a third-order polynomial fit separately on both sides of the threshold, I report supplementary results using that regression.

¹³For a fuller discussion of balance in election-based RD designs, see Caughey and Sekhon (2011); de la Cuesta and Imai (2016); Grimmer et al. (2012); Snyder (2005).

4 Results


4.1 Counties Represented by a Democratic and Republican Sheriff Comply with Detainer Requests at the Same Rate on Average

In Figure 2, I present a graphical version of the regression discontinuity design. The vertical axis represents a sheriff’s compliance rate with ICE detainer requests in a given year. The horizontal axis is the Democratic sheriff’s share of the two-party vote in the most recent sheriff election. The most striking feature of this figure is how similar the average compliance rate is across electoral environments. Counties in which the Democratic sheriff received around 65% of the two-party vote have a similar compliance rate to counties in which the Democratic sheriff won 35% of the vote. Consistent with this nearly flat relationship, there is almost no difference in average compliance rates at the discontinuity. It is important to note that the variable plotted on the vertical axis here is controlled by sheriffs. Previous work has shown that places that support Democrats at higher levels have more favorable policies toward unauthorized immigrants generally (Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan 2015; Provine et al. 2016). This plot, instead, shows that the enforcement policies sheriffs choose on their own are relatively similar in more and less Republican-leaning counties.

I report formal estimates of the local average treatment effect in Table 2. The first row presents estimates of the effect using all elections in the specified bandwidth. Columns 1-4 report estimates from fitting a local linear, third-order polynomial, third-order spline, and fifth-order polynomial function of the running variable. In columns 5-8, I report estimates from the using the same functional forms as in columns 1-4, but I also adjust for the county’s compliance rate in the year before the sheriff takes office. The compliance rate is changing throughout the years in my sample, meaning that the relationship between the compliance rate in time t and time $t - x$ is also changing. To address this, I include an interaction between a fully saturated set of dummies for year and election year as well as the election-year compliance rate. The last column reports the treatment effect estimated by the procedure described in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), which selects a bandwidth that minimizes the mean squared error of the treatment effect estimator and uses kernel regression with a triangular kernel.

Across specifications, the treatment effect estimates tend to be negative yet close to zero. The first row in column five, for example, reports a 2-percentage point lower compliance rate when a

Figure 2: **Republican and Democratic Sheriffs Comply with ICE Detainer Requests at the Same Rate.** Each of the large dots represent binned averages of the underlying data. The small dots are the raw data. The blue line comes from a third-order polynomial regression of compliance rate on Democratic vote share fit separately for counties with Democratic and Republican winners.



county’s sheriff is a Democrat versus a Republican. Returning to Figure 2, note that a large share of counties produce compliance rates above 70% or below 30%. Figure A.2 further shows that even counties receiving many requests have compliance rates outside of that range. A 2-percentage-point difference is barely noticeable in the natural variation of compliance rates. Taking the 95% confidence interval of the estimate from my preferred specification, column seven, only includes effects of -10%, which is still quite small relative to the authority sheriffs are granted and the natural variation in the measure.

As I described above, the outcome is undefined when the sheriff’s office receives no detainer requests and is therefore coded as missing. If these observations are not missing at random, this could bias my estimates. I conduct an initial check of this by limiting the analysis to large counties since they are, *ex ante*, more likely to have received at least one detainer request and therefore have a defined compliance rate. These estimates using only large-population counties and reported in Table A.3 are noisier but consistent with the estimates from the full sample.

Table 2: **Effect of Democratic Sheriff on Detainer Compliance Rate.** Democratic and Republican sheriffs representing similar counties at similar times comply with immigration detainer requests at nearly the same rate.

	Detainer Compliance Rate [0-1]								
Dem Sheriff Win	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
N	947	1894	1894	1894	722	1467	1467	1467	760
Elections	346	688	688	688	257	523	523	523	376
Deg of Running Var Func	1	3	3	5	1	3	3	5	CCT
Spline	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Year-Specific Lag DV	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Bandwidth	10	25	25	25	10	25	25	25	8

Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. The reported estimates come from regressions on the full sample of elections held between a Republican and a Democrat. Spline means that the flexible regression the outcome on Democratic vote share was fit separately on both sides of 0. Year-Specific Lag DV refers to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable interacted with a fully-saturated set of year-by-election-year dummies.

4.2 The Number of Detainer Requests Is Not Affected by the Partisanship of the Sheriff

One potential threat to my interpretation is the fact that the denominator in my measure of sheriff compliance is also post-treatment. To see the possible issue, assume that Democrats are in fact less likely to comply with a detainer request. If ICE knows this, they may respond by sending fewer requests, focusing on the requests with which the sheriff will comply. The effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on the compliance rate could be zero in this case, but not because Democratic and Republican sheriffs implement the same policy.

I investigate this possibility by estimating the effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on the total number of requests ICE sends. I normalize this measure of ICE response by dividing by the foreign born population as of the 2000 Census. The regression discontinuity design does not require normalization for the estimate to be unbiased, but without it, small changes in the number of requests in large counties could drive the results. On the other hand, a bad choice of normalization factor—one unrelated to the expected number of requests pre-treatment—could also introduce noise. Unfortunately, the expected number of requests cannot be directly estimated because it is always potentially subject to a political process. Instead, I choose the most plausible and universally available normalization factor from the Census. I report the resulting estimates in Table 3.

Table 3: **Effect of Democratic Sheriff on the Number of Detainer Requests.** Democratic and Republican sheriffs representing similar counties at similar times receive immigration detainer requests at nearly the same rate.

	Detainer Requests per 1,000 Foreign Born								
Dem Sheriff Win	5.34 (3.13)	0.57 (4.39)	10.60 (5.10)	4.94 (3.58)	0.64 (1.87)	0.97 (1.81)	2.26 (3.22)	1.06 (2.34)	11.90 (4.90)
N	1092	2171	2171	2171	1022	1984	1984	1984	647
Elections	369	732	732	732	342	666	666	666	285
Deg of Running Var Func	1	3	3	5	1	3	3	5	CCT
Spline	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Year-Specific Lag DV	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Bandwidth	10	25	25	25	10	25	25	25	6

Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. The reported estimates come from regressions on the full sample of elections held between a Republican and a Democrat. Spline means that the flexible regression the outcome on Democratic vote share was fit separately on both sides of 0. Year-Specific Lag DV refers to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable interacted with a fully-saturated set of year-by-election-year dummies.

Counter to the concern, I find that the number of requests per 1,000 foreign born that the sheriff receives, if anything, increases when a Democrat is elected to sheriff. This result is quite unstable across specifications, though. I suspect the main reason for this instability is the normalization. Since my measure of the foreign born population is from 2000, prior to all of the elections I am studying, the normalization factor is constant from year to year for a given county. Accordingly, the columns that add in controls for lagged outcomes adjust for imbalances due to the normalization factor and are more stable. These four columns imply that ICE sends roughly the same number of requests, regardless of whether the sheriff is a Democrat or Republican.

Looking at Figure 1 again, it is clear that there are multiple places in the pipeline from arrest to deportation that could be effected by choices the sheriff or ICE make. I have gathered administrative data on all of these, and tested the effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on these outcomes using the same regression discontinuity design. In Table A.4, I report the effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on the total number of background checks a sheriff runs, the number of background checks that result in an immigration database match, and the number of detainer requests with which the sheriff complies. I find that, at all other points along the pipeline from arrest to deportation, Republican and Democratic sheriffs behave similarly, and ICE makes similar choices regardless of the party of the sheriff.

4.3 Counties Represented by a Democratic and Republican Sheriff Are Similar across Other Immigration Policies and Outcomes

The primary advantage of focusing on the detainer request compliance rate as my main outcome is that it is nearly always chosen exclusively by the sheriff. While many other immigration enforcement decisions are made by other offices and are imposed on sheriffs, it is possible that sheriffs care more about other enforcement policies or have a way of influencing these policy without as much political cost. In line with the main findings, I find no effects of obtaining a Democratic sheriff on the stated immigration enforcement policies in the county.¹⁴ I estimate the effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on participation in the 287(g) program, contracting out jail beds for immigrant detention, alerting ICE of immigrants, and limits on ICE interrogations in the jail. Some of the estimates are noisy, making large effects, such as a 25% difference in the probability of participating in the program, fall within the 95% confidence interval. But, for the two policies with narrow confidence intervals—287(g) participation and detention contracts—the effect is nearly zero. I have included the formal estimates in Table A.6 in the appendix.

4.4 Convergence Is Similar with and without State Policy

During the period I am studying, seven states with partisan elected sheriffs implemented a policy that limited the ability of sheriffs to control the detainer request process.¹⁵ The implementation dates range from 2007 to 2015, and the policies include changes that make it harder to comply and those making it harder to not comply with a detainer request. Oklahoma, New Hampshire, and Virginia put in place laws allowing jails to release unauthorized immigrants into ICE custody before their scheduled release, making detainer requests less important. Alternatively, California and Connecticut (which do not have partisan sheriff races) limited the class of unauthorized immigrants who could be legally detained beyond their scheduled release.

These types of policy changes offer an illuminating yet somewhat limited natural experiment: does the difference in compliance rates between Democrats and Republicans get smaller when these policies go into place? Since the difference is already so close to zero on average, there is not very much room for these policies to further constrain. Still, I test this possibility using a triple

¹⁴The data on stated policies by county comes from the Immigrant Legal Resource Center.

¹⁵These states are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia.

differences design. I include county fixed effects and year fixed effects, using this to isolate the effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on compliance. I interact the indicator for a Democrat with an indicator for restrictive state policy and also include those indicators separately. I find that the coefficient on the interaction is 0.01 (s.e. 0.06) with the coefficient on the indicator for a Democrat being -0.03 (s.e. 0.03). The full results are reported in Table A.7 in the appendix. These results mean that the effect of electing a Democrat rather than a Republican sheriff is similar regardless of whether the state imposes constraints on the sheriff's behavior. State policy is most likely not the reason I observe similar compliance rates under Republican and Democratic sheriffs.

5 Explanations for Partisan Convergence

Why do Democratic and Republican sheriffs choose similar immigration enforcement policies? I begin my investigation by looking at the process by which a citizen becomes a general election candidate for sheriff. First, potential candidates are members of a national party and these parties have platforms on immigration enforcement. Second, these candidates must be registered to vote in the county that elects them. Third, they must choose to run. And finally, they are selected as their party's candidate in a primary election or convention. If the two candidates in the general election hold similar views about immigration enforcement, and they are able to implement these views costlessly, we would observe policy convergence like in the case of sheriffs. I evaluate partisan differences on immigration enforcement at multiple levels and find evidence that elected sheriffs are more similar across party lines than in the public or congress.

Nearly all of the data I present on sheriffs' immigration enforcement views comes from a period when they are subject to future elections. This leaves the door open to an important alternative mechanism: sheriffs may moderate their views to suit the preferences of voters. This mechanism is harder to evaluate. In a small number of states, sheriffs can only serve for two or three terms. I present suggestive evidence that sheriffs do not make partisan enforcement decisions even when they reach their final term in office.

5.1 Immigration Enforcement Splits Lawmakers

One important potential explanation for my finding is that sheriffs are just as partisan as legislators, but immigration enforcement is not a partisan issue. The US House provides a nice baseline comparison for sheriffs. A large body of empirical work has demonstrated that members of the US House from different parties vote in markedly different ways (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004). Is immigration enforcement one of the issues that splits Republicans and Democrats?


I use a regression discontinuity design to test this, comparing the voting behavior of members of opposing parties serving similar, competitive districts. I analyze roll call votes on four pieces of legislation from 2007, 2012, 2013, and 2017. The issues, described in the appendix, all relate to programs that encourage local cooperation with ICE, either changing funding for them, constraining them, or punishing localities for not participating. Figure 3 presents the graphical results. I report the formal results in Table A.8 in the appendix.

I find that Democrats are much less likely to support aggressive local immigration enforcement in all four cases. For some of the House votes, a large share of the difference between Republicans and Democrats is explained by local district qualities. But, in all four cases, the party of the member matters even in the identical districts at the threshold between just barely electing a Democrat or Republican. The votes occurred at different times throughout my analysis window and were on different issues. Accordingly, it is difficult to say whether these partisan differences are getting larger or the votes they are taking are focusing more on the areas where the parties differ. Either way, these results rule out the possibility that the national parties have similar positions on immigration enforcement. And they provide a useful baseline, highlighting the puzzle of sheriffs implementing the same policy regardless of party.

5.2 Immigration Enforcement Splits Citizens

Another simple explanation for partisan convergence among sheriffs is that immigration enforcement is a regional issue. Even though the national parties hold different views, this may simply reflect the fact that one party is stronger in places that favor stronger enforcement. This is hard to square with the regression discontinuity result from the US House presented above, but it could be that counties

Figure 3: **The Effect of Democratic House Member on Anti-Sanctuary Votes.** Republican members of the US House of Representatives are much more likely to support bills or amendments that punish localities for failing to work with federal immigration enforcement in some way than are their Democratic colleagues. This is true even in districts with nearly identical preferences. The votes in 2007, 2012, and 2013 were amendments to Department of Homeland Security appropriations bills. The vote in 2017 was on HR 3003, titled the No Sanctuary For Criminals Act.



are much more ideologically homogeneous than congressional districts. Alternatively, logrolling or strong-arming in the US House may allow members to cooperate and make choices closer to the national party's preference than their district's.

In order to get around these limitations of the US House regression discontinuity design, I estimate within-county partisan differences on immigration policy preferences using the CCES. Even compared to other members of their county, Democrats and Republicans respond differently to questions about immigration policy, including immigration enforcement. These differences also persist across census regions. And these differences are similar for counties used in the sheriff RD estimates and those that are not. I report the average differences for individual survey questions from 2006 to 2016 in Table 4. Differences on measures two and five in the table, reported in columns two, five, and six, are the most relevant here because they ask directly about live immigration law enforcement matters. The exact point estimates are not particularly important. Instead, the sign

Table 4: **Differences in Immigration Attitudes by Party Within County.** Respondents to the CCES who identify themselves as aligned with Democrats respond more negatively to questions about strict immigration enforcement and more favorably to questions about pro-immigration measures than do Republicans. This is true even when compared to Republicans who live in their county. This within-county relationship holds across all four census regions.

	2006 (1)	2010 (2)	2012 (3)	2012 (4)	2014 (5)	2016 (5)
Dem	-0.36 (0.01)	-0.53 (0.00)	-0.32 (0.01)	-0.43 (0.01)	-0.43 (0.01)	-0.43 (0.01)
Dem X West	-0.45 (0.01)	-0.57 (0.01)	-0.35 (0.01)	-0.48 (0.01)	-0.48 (0.01)	-0.45 (0.01)
Dem X South	-0.33 (0.01)	-0.52 (0.01)	-0.32 (0.01)	-0.42 (0.01)	-0.42 (0.01)	-0.43 (0.01)
Dem X Northeast	-0.35 (0.02)	-0.53 (0.01)	-0.31 (0.01)	-0.41 (0.01)	-0.39 (0.01)	-0.42 (0.01)
Dem X Midwest	-0.29 (0.01)	-0.50 (0.01)	-0.31 (0.01)	-0.41 (0.01)	-0.40 (0.01)	-0.43 (0.01)
Dem X RD Sample	-0.36 (0.01)	-0.53 (0.01)	-0.31 (0.01)	-0.43 (0.01)	-0.42 (0.01)	-0.43 (0.01)
Dem X Not RD Sample	-0.35 (0.01)	-0.53 (0.01)	-0.33 (0.01)	-0.43 (0.01)	-0.44 (0.01)	-0.43 (0.01)
N	28984	47952	45847	45847	44772	51919
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each column presents results for a survey measure and survey year. All responses are coded so that the response most similar to support for enforcement is 1 and the other response is 0. The measures, in order from 1 to 5, are about citizenship for undocumented immigrants, the ability of police to question people about the citizenship, denial of citizenship to children of undocumented immigrants, prohibitions on hospital care and public school use by undocumented immigrants, and identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants.

and general magnitude is what matters, indicating that these views on immigration policy differ across party lines within counties. The partisan differences in responses to most of these questions suggests that if sheriffs were randomly drawn from the full set of co-partisans in their county and implemented their ideal policy, the compliance rate and other policy outcomes should differ based on the political party of the sheriff.

5.3 Democratic Sheriffs Donate to Liberal Candidates, Republicans Donate to Conservatives


Even if Democrats and Republicans hold different views on immigration policy within a given county, Democratic and Republican sheriff candidates running against one another could hold similar views. Fourteen states require candidates for sheriff to have prior experience or training in law enforcement. And most elected sheriffs outside of these states have law enforcement experience even where it is not strictly required (Farris and Holman 2017). This sometimes statutory requirement for running limits the pool of possible candidates. It may be that Democrats and Republicans with law enforcement have similar policy views across the board based on shared experiences.

The most direct test of broad ideological differences between sheriff candidates of opposing parties suggests that there are meaningful gaps between partisans. I use Adam Bonica’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) to understand the political choices sheriffs make in their personal lives (Bonica 2013). DIME uses campaign finance data from the state and federal level to construct a measure of ideology called the CFScore. This data is often used to measure the ideology of candidates by looking at the donations they receive. Instead, I focus on the donations sheriffs make in their personal capacity. This reveals more about the sheriff’s partisan commitments separate from the constraints they face in office. I find that the donations Democratic sheriff candidates make earn them CFScores that are different by about two-thirds of the distance between Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Paul Ryan.¹⁶ The results are similar when I compare all Democratic sheriff candidates to all Republican sheriff candidates rather than comparing sheriff candidates running against one another. These results are reported in Table A.9 in the appendix.

This result comes with two important caveats. First, most sheriff candidates do not make political donations that appear in the DIME. Accordingly, this is only a comparison among candidates who are sufficiently engaged in national or state politics to make a donation and may overstate the degree to which the average Democratic sheriff candidate differs from the average Republican candidate. This analysis also depends on CFScores from sheriff candidates who make only a few donations. The CFScores, then, are quite imprecise for a particular individual. Overall, setting aside the question of whether the set who donate have similar preferences to those who do not, the

¹⁶Nancy Pelosi has a CFScore of -1.124. Paul Ryan has a CFScore of 1.071

Figure 4: **Smaller Partisan Differences Among Sheriffs Than Public.** In surveys fielded in the same year and asking similar questions, sheriffs responded in a more similar way across party than the general public. The surveys asked whether the respondent approves or disapproves of increased border enforcement (“border”) and police asking about immigration status (“inquire”). The partisan split is larger on police-specific activities for the general public and smaller for sheriffs.



most accurate thing I can say about sheriff candidate donation patterns is that they are most often giving to people with their party label.

5.4 Democratic and Republican Sheriffs Hold Similar Views on Their Role in Immigration Enforcement

The campaign finance-based results suggest that, on a broad set of issues, sheriffs who run as Democrats likely agree with Democrats more often, and likewise for Republicans. This does not necessarily mean that Republican and Democratic sheriff candidates share views on immigration enforcement.

This final candidate entry explanation for convergence—that Democrats and Republicans running for sheriff share views on immigration enforcement—is difficult to directly test. While giving to candidates may plausibly be unrelated to their job, future candidates for sheriff are likely loathe to state views that about immigration enforcement that would make it difficult to get elected. Still, it is useful to see whether Democratic and Republican sheriff candidates say they have different

immigration policy preferences. No one to my knowledge surveyed sheriff candidates during the period I am studying. Instead, I have re-analyzed a survey of sitting sheriffs conducted in 2012 by Farris and Holman (2015, 2017).

In their survey, Farris and Holman ask sheriffs about their personal views on immigration policy. Two of the questions they ask are similar, though not identical, to two questions asked in the CCES during the same year.¹⁷ The questions ask whether the respondent approves of increased border enforcement and police inquiring about immigration status. Figure 4 presents the degree to which Democrats and Republicans split on these questions across the two surveys. I find evidence that sheriffs are more similar across party than non-sheriffs. While neither of these questions directly addresses detainer requests, the question about police asking people to reveal their immigration status is relevant for the job of sheriff. On this question, the share of Republican supporting the policy is nearly 50% greater than the share of Democrats. Among sheriffs that difference is less than 10% and cannot be distinguished from zero given sampling variability.

The pattern of responses across the two surveys suggests that sheriffs from different parties are more likely to agree on immigration policy than randomly selected citizens from opposing parties. Sheriffs are particularly likely to agree on an immigration enforcement matter directly relevant to their job. These results do not necessarily imply that the convergence in compliance rates is mostly a function of the types of people who run for sheriff—sheriffs could be stating their public policy position when responding to the survey, and these positions could be impacted by their interests in reelection. But, given the anonymity of the survey, it is the best evidence supporting the selection mechanism. It appears that, despite likely having different political views on many other issues, people who choose to run for sheriff as Democrats have similar views on the sheriff’s role and authority in immigration enforcement as do those who run as Republicans.

5.5 Convergence Is Similar When Facing Term Limits

The sheriff survey was conducted by interviewing sitting sheriffs. Most of those sheriffs are likely to run for sheriff again. Are the survey and the compliance rate results a consequence of these sheriffs pursuing a policy position that gets them reelected?

¹⁷I have included the exact language of the questions in the appendix.

Table 5: **Effect of Dem Sheriff on Compliance Rate, Term Limited vs Non-Term Limited Sheriffs.** Democratic and Republic sheriffs who have reached a statutory term limit do not comply with detainer requests at noticeably different rates after adjusting for changes in the compliance rate over time and differences between counties that elect Democrats and Republicans. Term limited sheriffs comply with detainer requests at a higher rate, but this may reflect something about the types of sheriffs who make it to the term limit.

	Detainer Compliance Rate [0-1]			
Dem X Term Limited	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.00 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.11)
Dem	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)
Term Limited	0.00 (0.05)	0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Candidates	91	91	91	91
Counties	45	45	45	45
N	326	326	326	326
Year FE	N	Y	Y	Y
County FE	N	N	N	Y
County Controls	N	N	Y	N

Robust standard errors clustered by county in parentheses. The reported estimates come from counties with sheriff term limits in Colorado, Indiana, and New Mexico.

A key prediction of the Fearon (1999) model of electoral accountability is that, if an elected official is ideologically distant from the median voter, she will moderate to win reelection but will not moderate when she faces no threat of removal from office. In four states, sheriffs are limited to a certain number of terms in office.¹⁸ Using a number of different panel regression specifications, I compare convergence with and without reelection incentives in place. The results are reported in Table 5.

Given the limited number of cases, the evidence is quite noisy. My approach also does not isolate the causal effect as cleanly as a fully within-candidate design (Fournaies and Hall 2018). I am unable to completely rule out the possibility that electoral sanction is responsible the convergence. But recall the size of the difference between partisans in the public on immigration policy questions. And recall the large difference in voting patterns on immigration enforcement between Democrats and Republicans in the US House. The upper bound implied by the 95% confidence intervals for

¹⁸These states are Colorado, Indiana, New Mexico, and West Virginia.

all four of the estimates in Table 5 are not quite large enough to explain the difference between the preferences of sheriffs and their co-partisans in the general public.

6 Conclusion

In February, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions went before a gathering of the National Sheriffs' Association, telling them, “[t]he most important thing that any government does is keep its citizens safe. The first civil right is the right to be safe. Too often, politics gets in the way of that mission.”¹⁹ His concern is broadly held, as many worry that local governments will pursue policies elected officials prefer or that are politically expedient rather than those that keep their community safe and cause the least harm. Many on the right point to sanctuary policies, while many on the left point to historic rates of incarceration, both as examples of political interference in the administration of justice.

In this paper, I ask whether the party that controls the office administering justice influences the law enforcement behavior. Many law enforcement decisions are hard to observe or made jointly by many institutional actors. It is also difficult to distinguish the effect of political control from other peculiarities in the local politics. I focus on a case in which a sheriff is given considerable discretion and all of her decisions are recorded. And I use a regression discontinuity design to isolate the independent effect of electing a Democratic rather than Republican sheriff. I find that Democratic and Republican sheriffs make remarkably similar choices regarding whether to comply with a federal request to detain an unauthorized immigrant.

This result runs contrary to the expectations we would have from reading the work on legislative voting patterns. I demonstrate this directly, showing that Democratic and Republican members of Congress from identical US House districts vote for quite different immigration enforcement policies once in office.

I investigate two possible explanations for why local law enforcement might be different. First, I ask whether the types of people who run for sheriff are different from their co-partisans. I find evidence that, while sheriffs who run as Democrats likely hold more liberal views generally, and Republicans likely hold more conservative views, Democratic and Republican sheriff candidates

¹⁹<https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-national-sheriffs-association>.

hold similar views on immigration-related law enforcement matters. Second, I do not find support for the claim that sheriffs converge under electoral pressure. These results point to an important role for candidate selection in maintaining non-partisan law enforcement behavior.

Going forward, an important question this paper leaves open is exactly what policy the candidate selection process produces.²⁰ A number of roles in local government, particularly in the criminal justice system, require special expertise or draw out particular types of candidates. My results point toward this selection process as a constraint on partisanship in the administration of justice. But, this constraint may also result in law enforcement and criminal justice officials that are less sensitive to the needs of their community.

²⁰Gordon and Huber (2002) and Huber and Gordon (2004) discuss related questions in the area of criminal prosecutions and sentencing.

References

- Alesina, Alberto. 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters." *The American Economic Review* 78(4): 796–805.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart, III. 2001. "Candidate Positioning in US House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 136–159.
- Ashworth, Scott. 2012. "Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 183–201.
- Besley, Timothy. 2004. "Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2(2-3): 193–215.
- Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case. 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence From the United States." *Journal of Economic Literature* 41(1): 7–73.
- Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(1): 85–114.
- Bonica, Adam. 2013. "Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(2): 294–311.
- Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik. 2014. "Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs." *Econometrica* 82(6): 2295–2326.
- Cattaneo, Matias D, Nicolas Idrobo, and Rocio Titiunik. 2017. "A Practical Introduction to Regression Discontinuity Designs." Working Manuscript.
- Caughey, Devin M., and Jasjeet S. Sekhon. 2011. "Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design: Lessons from Close US House Races, 1942–2008." *Political Analysis* 19(4): 385–408.
- Caughey, Devin, Yiqing Xu, and Christopher Warshaw. 2017. "Incremental Democracy: The Policy Effects of Partisan Control of State Government." *The Journal of Politics* 79(4): 1342–1358.
- de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin, and Christopher Warshaw. 2016. "Mayoral Partisanship and Municipal Fiscal Policy." *The Journal of Politics* 78(4): 1124–1138.
- de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin, and Christopher Warshaw. 2018. Politics in Forgotten Governments: The Partisan Composition of County Legislatures and County Fiscal Policies. Technical report Working paper.
- de la Cuesta, Brandon, and Kosuke Imai. 2016. "Misunderstandings About the Regression Discontinuity Design in the Study of Close Elections." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19: 375–396.
- Eggers, Andrew C, Anthony Fowler, Jens Hainmueller, Andrew B Hall, and James M Snyder. 2015. "On the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design for Estimating Electoral Effects: New Evidence from Over 40,000 Close Races." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1): 259–274.
- Farris, Emily M, and Mirya R Holman. 2015. "Public Officials and a "Private" Matter: Attitudes and Policies in the County Sheriff Office Regarding Violence Against Women." *Social Science Quarterly* 96(4): 1117–1135.

- Farris, Emily M, and Mirya R Holman. 2017. "All Politics is Local? County Sheriffs and Localized Policies of Immigration Enforcement." *Political Research Quarterly* 70(1): 142–154.
- Fearon, James D. 1999. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, ed. Bernard Mann, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes. Cambridge University Press pp. 55–97.
- Ferreira, Fernando, and Joseph Gyourko. 2009. "Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from US Cities." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(1): 399–422.
- Fourinaies, Alexander, and Andrew B Hall. 2018. "How Do Electoral Incentives Affect Legislator Behavior?"
- Fowler, Anthony, and Andrew B Hall. 2016. "The Elusive Quest for Convergence." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11(1): 131–49.
- Fox, Richard L, and Jennifer L Lawless. 2005. "To Run or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 642–659.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R, and Daniel J Hopkins. 2011. "When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 326–339.
- Gordon, Sanford C. 2009. "Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Public Corruption Prosecutions." *American Political Science Review* 103(4): 534–554.
- Gordon, Sanford C, and Gregory A Huber. 2002. "Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors." *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 334–351.
- Grimmer, Justin, Eitan Hersh, Brian Feinstein, and Daniel Carpenter. 2012. "Are Close Elections Random?" Presented at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. <https://www.dropbox.com/s/e92fezclgfvvl2k/cef2.pdf?dl=0>.
- Gulasekaram, Pratheepan, and S Karthick Ramakrishnan. 2015. *The New Immigration Federalism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, Andrew B. 2017. "Who Wants to Run? How the Devaluing of Political Office Drives Polarization." Working Manuscript.
- Huber, Gregory A, and Sanford C Gordon. 2004. "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 247–263.
- Imbens, Guido W., and Thomas Lemieux. 2008. "Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice." *Journal of Econometrics* 142(2): 615–635.
- Kousser, Thad. 2002. "The Politics of Discretionary Medicaid Spending, 1980–1993." *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 27(4): 639–672.
- Lee, David S, and Thomas Lemieux. 2010. "Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics." *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(2): 281–355.
- Lee, David S, Enrico Moretti, and Matthew J Butler. 2004. "Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the US House." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119(3): 807–859.

- Osborne, Martin J, and Al Slivinski. 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 111(1): 65–96.
- Provine, Doris Marie, Monica W Varsanyi, Paul G Lewis, and Scott H Decker. 2016. *Policing immigrants: Local law enforcement on the front lines*. University of Chicago Press.
- Skovron, Christopher, and Rocío Titiunik. 2015. "A Practical Guide to Regression Discontinuity Designs in Political Science." Working Paper.
- Snyder, Jason. 2005. "Detecting Manipulation in US House Elections." Unpublished Manuscript, University of California, Los Angeles. <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.335.6505&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.
- Thomsen, Danielle M. 2014. "Ideological Moderates Won't Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress." *The Journal of Politics* 76(3): 786–797.

Online Appendix

Intended for online publication only.

Contents

A.1	Additional Descriptive Results About Detainer Requests and Sheriff Elections . . .	30
A.1.1	Detainer Requests Sent to Sheriffs Over Time	30
A.1.2	Distribution of Compliance Rates for Counties with Many and Few Requests	31
A.1.3	Sheriff Election Sample	32
A.2	Additional Statistical Results	34
A.2.1	RD Balance Table on Lagged Detainer Compliance Rate	34
A.2.2	Partisan Convergence in Large vs All Counties	35
A.2.3	Effect of Democratic Sheriff on Contributors to the Number of Requests . .	36
A.2.4	Effect of Democratic Sheriff on Compliance Rate by Most Serious Crime . .	37
A.2.5	Effect of Democratic Sheriff on Stated Policies	38
A.2.6	Effect of State Policy on Convergence	39
A.2.7	Effect of Electing Democratic Representative on Sanctuary Policy Roll Call Votes	40
A.2.8	Sheriff Campaign Donation Analysis	41
A.3	Details for Mechanisms Analyses	42
A.3.1	Votes Used in the US House Analysis	42
A.3.2	Questions Used in the CCES Analysis	42
A.3.3	Questions Used in the Joint CCES and Sheriff Analysis	43

A.1 Additional Descriptive Results About Detainer Requests and Sheriff Elections

A.1.1 Detainer Requests Sent to Sheriffs Over Time

Figure A.1: **The Number of Detainer Requests Sent to Sheriffs, 2006–2015.** The number of detainer requests peaked in 2011. The compliance rate peaked in 2009 and declined from 73% in 2008 and 2009 to 43% in 2015.





Figure A.1 presents the total number of requests sheriffs received, and the number with which they complied, over time. The number of requests sheriffs received peaked in 2011. The number with which they complied peaked in 2010. The changes through time are in part due to changes in federal policy around the use of detainers. The main program using detainers rolled out in 2008 and ramped up until 2013. Throughout this period, policy changed around who the detainers should be used for, with the most notable change coming in 2014 when the Obama administration ended the use of detainers for immigrants not convicted of a crime.

A.1.2 Distribution of Compliance Rates for Counties with Many and Few Requests

Figure A.2: **The Distribution of Compliance Rates by Request Decile** The distribution of compliance rates in counties that received more requests are plotted in darker shades. The bottom third of counties received no detainer requests, leaving only seven lines. The top three deciles include counties that received 80 requests or more.



An important part of my analysis is a theoretical quantity that I cannot measure: a sheriff's propensity to comply with a detainer request. To interpret the convergence results properly, it is critical to know whether sheriffs actually have control over the propensity to comply. There is quite a bit of legal reasoning and informed discussion of about the freedom sheriffs have to comply or not, but if they do, there should at least be some evidence of differences in propensities to comply from county to county.

If all requests were identical, the rate of compliance across a large number of draws will recover propensity to comply. But some counties receive very few requests. The small number of requests introduces sampling variance that is independent of the variance in propensity to comply across counties. To address this, I plot the distribution of compliance rates by decile of requests received. The plot, Figure A.2, demonstrates that even counties receiving many requests vary quite a lot in the propensity to comply.

A.1.3 Sheriff Election Sample

I gathered the sheriff election data using two strategies. First, I gathered data from state authorities overseeing elections in 15 states where they collected county election results. Since this only represents a small percentage of the overall counties in the country, I also gathered election data directly from counties. I visited every county elections board website for counties with more than 100,000 people as of the 2000 Census. In table A.1, I compare the elections I gathered to all sheriff elections that occurred from 2003 to 2016. Since I was able to get data from most counties with populations over 100,000, I have nearly a census of those elections. My data coverage is also bent toward larger counties because I over sampled them with my strategy. This comparison simply describes the counties for which my analysis applies and provides guidance about the generalizability of my results—it does not implicate the internal validity of my findings.

Table A.1: Comparison of Election Sample to Universe of Sheriff Elections

	<u>All Counties</u>		<u>Large & Partisan</u>	
	All	Gathered	All	Gathered
<i>Geographic Region</i>				
Midwest	0.32 (0.47)	0.18 (0.38)	0.27 (0.44)	0.27 (0.44)
Northeast	0.07 (0.25)	0.11 (0.32)	0.23 (0.42)	0.24 (0.43)
South	0.49 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.41 (0.49)	0.40 (0.49)
West	0.12 (0.32)	0.18 (0.38)	0.09 (0.29)	0.09 (0.29)
Dist to Mex Border	8.62 (3.73)	9.95 (3.92)	10.12 (4.46)	10.44 (4.38)
<i>Population</i>				
All	83.56 (268.99)	175.25 (443.86)	346.07 (432.87)	367.52 (462.30)
Foreign Born	8.05 (69.69)	20.93 (121.50)	34.08 (81.85)	37.07 (88.94)
<i>Politics</i>				
President	0.44 (0.17)	0.44 (0.15)	0.50 (0.13)	0.50 (0.13)
Governor	0.30 (0.46)	0.27 (0.44)	0.32 (0.47)	0.30 (0.46)
State House	0.51 (0.12)	0.50 (0.13)	0.51 (0.12)	0.52 (0.13)
State Senate	0.48 (0.13)	0.49 (0.13)	0.48 (0.13)	0.48 (0.13)
Num of Counties	3083	1395	420	397
Obs	11052	3500	1530	1216

Standard deviation in parentheses.

A.2 Additional Statistical Results

A.2.1 RD Balance Table on Lagged Detainer Compliance Rate

The key assumption behind the regression discontinuity design is that counties that just barely elect a Democrat are just like those that just barely elect a Republican in terms of all things not impacted by the outcome of the election. The best test of this is whether counties on either side of the cutoff were similar in terms of pre-treatment outcomes. I present tests of this in Table A.2.

For elections held early in the study window, like those held in 2004 or 2006, most counties had received no detainer requests before the election, so they are not included in the analysis. This smaller sample means that I have noisier estimates. Across all five estimators, I cannot reject the null of perfect balance. Since the third-order polynomial with a 25% bandwidth results in the best balance, I choose that as my preferred specification for discussion in the body of the paper.

The specifications reported in column one and two, while not meaningfully different from zero given the sampling error, are far enough from zero that it is worth adjusting for these remaining imbalances. Accordingly, I adjust for these imbalances in columns five through eight in the main analysis in the body of the paper.

Table A.2: **Effect of Dem Sheriff on Pre-Treatment Detainer Compliance Rate**

	Pre-Treatment Detainer Compliance Rate				
Dem (All)	0.06 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
Dem (Large)	0.05 (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.10)
N (All)	889	1807	1807	1807	597
N (Large)	525	1087	1087	1087	288
Elections (All)	264	538	538	538	314
Elections (Large)	155	319	319	319	279
Deg of Running Var Func	1	3	3	5	CCT
Spline	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Bandwidth All (Large)	10	25	25	25	7 (6)

Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. The reported estimates come from regressions on the full sample of elections held between a Republican and a Democrat as well as a subsample of elections held in counties with population greater than 100,000 as of the 2000 Census. Spline means that the flexible regression the outcome on Democratic vote share was fit separately on both sides of 0.

A.2.2 Partisan Convergence in Large vs All Counties

Table A.3 presents the effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on detainer request compliance rates in all counties in the election sample as well as only the counties with more than 100,000 residents as of 2000. One of the challenges to the validity of my main estimates is the fact that counties that receive no request drop out entirely. If ICE responds to Democratic sheriffs by sending fewer requests, some of these counties could drop out of the analysis altogether. Counties with larger populations are, simply by the fact of having more people, more likely to have at least one person ICE seeks to detain in a year. Accordingly, estimates based only on large counties are less likely to be missing in the data even if ICE were changing the number of requests they send.

Table A.3: **Effect of Dem Sheriff on Detainer Compliance Rate**

	Detainer Compliance Rate								
Dem (All)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
Dem (Large)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)
N (All)	947	1894	1894	1894	722	1467	1467	1467	760
N (Large)	605	1237	1237	1237	457	941	941	941	444
Elections (All)	346	688	688	688	257	523	523	523	376
Elections (Large)	209	430	430	430	154	318	318	318	365
Deg of Running Var Func	1	3	3	5	1	3	3	5	CCT
Spline	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Year-Specific Lag DV	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Bandwidth All (Large)	10	25	25	25	10	25	25	25	8 (8)

Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. The reported estimates come from regressions on the full sample of elections held between a Republican and a Democrat as well as a subsample of elections held in counties with population greater than 100,000 as of the 2000 Census. Spline means that the flexible regression the outcome on Democratic vote share was fit separately on both sides of 0. Year-Specific Lag DV refers to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable interacted with a fully-saturated set of year-by- election-year dummies.

A.2.3 Effect of Democratic Sheriff on Contributors to the Number of Requests

As presented in Figure 1, a number of decisions must be made by ICE and sheriffs for someone to ultimately be detained and deported. I gathered data on each of these decisions. In Table A.4, I report the effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on the number of cases that pass each decision point. I find no meaningful effect of electing a Democrat on any of these outcomes.

Table A.4: **Effect of Dem Sheriff on Number of Detainer Requests**

	Contributors to Num of Requests				
	BG Checks	Imm BG Checks	No Requests	Num Requests	Num Comply
Dem (All)	3.12 (5.67)	-0.66 (10.79)	-0.12 (0.10)	10.60 (5.10)	7.66 (3.31)
Dem (Large)	-4.77 (8.79)	-3.36 (5.39)	-0.01 (0.09)	1.97 (2.51)	2.10 (1.67)
N (All)	1165	1162	2981	2171	2171
N (Large)	462	462	1571	1373	1373
Counties (All)	594	593	907	732	732
Counties (Large)	239	239	475	445	445
Deg of Running Var Func	3	3	3	3	3
Spline	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bandwidth	25	25	25	25	25

Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. The reported estimates come from regressions on the full sample of elections held between a Republican and a Democrat as well as a subsample of elections held in counties with population greater than 100,000 as of the 2000 Census.

A.2.4 Effect of Democratic Sheriff on Compliance Rate by Most Serious Crime

In Table A.5, I report the effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on the compliance rate with requests for different types of immigrants. The first column simply replicates the main finding from the body of the paper. The second through fifth columns report the effect on the rate at which a sheriff complies with detainer requests for immigrants who are not convicted of any crimes, convicted of misdemeanors, convicted of non-aggravated felonies (serious but nonviolent offenses), and aggravated felonies (murder, rape, drug or human trafficking, etc.), respectively. The results are noisy, but are consistent with the main convergence result.

Table A.5: **Effect of Dem Sheriff on Detainer Compliance Rate**

	Detainer Compliance Rate				
	All	No Crime	Misd.	Non-Agg Felony	Agg Felony
Dem (All)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)
Dem (Large)	0.02 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)
N (All)	1894	1472	1285	976	1236
N (Large)	1237	966	885	765	898
Counties (All)	688	535	491	398	479
Counties (Large)	430	335	318	289	324
Deg of Running Var Func	3	3	3	3	3
Spline	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. The reported estimates come from regressions on the full sample of elections held between a Republican and a Democrat as well as a subsample of elections held in counties with population greater than 100,000 as of the 2000 Census.

A.2.5 Effect of Democratic Sheriff on Stated Policies

Drawing on data from the Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC), I estimate the effect of electing a Democratic sheriff on the stated policies in the county. The policies I include in the analysis are, from column one to column four, not having a 287(g) agreement with ICE, not having a detention contract with ICE, not alerting ICE about inmate release, and limits on ICE interrogations in the jail. In some counties, these policies are already set by the state and cannot be impacted unilaterally by a sheriff. The surveyed states and counties about policies in 2015, gathering only a snapshot in time of the policies.

Table A.6 presents the results. The results are noisy, but in row one and columns one a two, where the estimates are more precise, I estimate effects of electing a Democratic sheriff that are close to zero.

Table A.6: **Effect of Dem Sheriff on Stated Policies**

	Policy			
	No 287(g)	No Detention	No Alerts	Interog Limits
Dem (All)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.05)	0.03 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.10)
Dem (Large)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.04 (0.15)	0.21 (0.37)	0.20 (0.18)
N (All)	309	309	309	309
N (Large)	144	144	144	144
Counties (All)	309	309	309	309
Counties (Large)	144	144	144	144
Deg of Running Var Func	3	3	3	3
Spline	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bandwidth	25	25	25	25

Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. The reported estimates come from regressions on the full sample of elections held between a Republican and a Democrat as well as a subsample of elections held in counties with population greater than 100,000 as of the 2000 Census.

A.2.6 Effect of State Policy on Convergence

Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia passed laws that constrained the role a sheriff plays in the cooperative with ICE. I use these states (with the exception of New Hampshire and Virginia which are not in my data) to estimate the effect of state-level constraints on sheriff divergence. Table A.7 presents the results. My preferred specification, a triple differences approach, is reported in column 4. I find little evidence that state-level policy plays an important role in producing the convergence I observe.

Table A.7: **Effect of Dem Sheriff on Compliance Rate, State Detainer Policy vs No Policy**

	Detainer Compliance Rate			
Dem X Sate Policy	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.06)
Dem	-0.07 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)
State Policy	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)
Counties	852	852	852	852
N	4567	4567	4567	4567
Year FE	N	Y	Y	Y
County FE	N	N	N	Y
County Controls	N	N	Y	N

Robust standard errors clustered by county in parentheses. The reported estimates come from counties with sheriff term limits in Colorado, Indiana, and New Mexico.

A.2.7 Effect of Electing Democratic Representative on Sanctuary Policy Roll Call Votes

In table A.8, I report the formal statistical results that accompany Figure 3 from the body. Replacing a Republican member of the US House with a Democrat results in a large drop in the probability that the representative will vote for measures that punish local sanctuary policies. In all four columns, I estimate a third order polynomial regression separately on both sides of the threshold using elections in which the Democrat received between 25% and 75% of the vote.

Table A.8: **Effect of Dem House Member on Anti-Sanctuary Voting**

	Anti-Sanctuary Vote			
	2007	2012	2013	2017
Dem	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.51 (0.15)	-0.44 (0.15)	-0.88 (0.10)
N	311	332	309	246
Deg of Running Var Func	3	3	3	3
Spline	Y	Y	Y	Y

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The reported estimates come from regressions on the full sample of elections held between a Republican and a Democrat.

A.2.8 Sheriff Campaign Donation Analysis

In table A.9, I report the average difference between CF Scores for Republican and Democratic sheriff candidates. The first column presents the simple difference. The second column presents the average difference between Democrats and Republicans running in the same county. The third column presents the average difference when the Republican and Democrat are running against one another in the same election. The CF Scores are likely quite imprecise estimates of the sheriff candidate's underlying preference for certain type of candidates in some cases, given how few donations many of the sheriff candidates make. Yet, it is valuable to note that Democrats make donations that place them noticeably to the left of Republicans.

Table A.9: **Differences in CFScore from Sheriff's Personal Political Contributions by Party.**

	CFScore		
Dem	-1.43 (0.03)	-1.46 (0.08)	-1.55 (0.07)
N	1186	414	256
County FE	N	Y	N
Election FE	N	N	Y

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.3 Details for Mechanisms Analyses

A.3.1 Votes Used in the US House Analysis

In my analysis of roll call votes in the US House of Representatives, I draw on four votes:

- 2007, House Vote 485: Amendment on an appropriations bill blocking federal resources from going to localities that fail to share requested information on the immigration status of people they know to be unauthorized.
- 2012, House Vote 366: Amendment to a DHS appropriations bill restricting the use of fund for terminating the 287(g) program which facilitates cooperation between ICE and local law enforcement agencies.
- 2013, House Vote 195: Amendment to a DHS appropriations bill that would strike \$43,592,000 in funding for the 287(g) program and send 10% of that amount to the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.
- 2017, House Vote 342: A bill known as Kate’s Law that would take numerous measures to penalize local and state governments for enacting a variety of sanctuary policies.

A.3.2 Questions Used in the CCES Analysis

In my analysis of within-county partisan differences in immigration-related policy views, I drew on five questions:

- 2006 (1): Another issue is illegal immigration. One plan considered by the Senate would offer illegal immigrants who already live in the U.S. more opportunities to become legal citizens. Some politicians argue that people who have worked hard in jobs that the economy depends should be offered the chance to live here legally. Other politicians argue that the plan is an amnesty that rewards people who have broken the law. What do you think? If you were faced with this decision, would you vote for or against this proposal?
- 2010 (2), isolating responses to the fifth bullet: What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply.
 - Fine Businesses
 - Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.
 - Increase the number of guest workers allowed to come legally to the US.
 - Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border.
 - Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally.
 - None of these.
- 2012 (3): What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply. Deny automatic citizenship to American-born children of illegal immigrants.
- 2012 (4): What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply. Prohibit illegal immigrants from using emergency hospital care and public schools.
- 2014 and 2016 (5): What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply. Identify and deport illegal immigrants.

A.3.3 Questions Used in the Joint CCES and Sheriff Analysis

I use two items from the CCES for the joint CCES and sheriff analysis. They come from a single question in which the survey begins:

“What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply.”

I analyze whether the respondent agreed or disagreed with two policies:

- Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border.
- Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally.

The questions I use from Farris and Holman (2017) are

- Federal spending on tightening border security and preventing illegal immigration should be increased.
- In routine patrols, law enforcement should be allowed to inquire about a person’s citizenship status.